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Game Theoretic Problems in Network Economics and Mechanism Design Solutions (Hardcover)
    ¡¤ ÁöÀºÀÌ | ¿Å±äÀÌ:Y. Narahari, Dinesh Garg, Ramasuri Narayanam
    ¡¤ ÃâÆÇ»ç:Springer-Verlag New York Inc
    ¡¤ ÃâÆdz⵵:2009
    ¡¤ Ã¥»óÅÂ:ÃÖ»ó±Þ / ¾çÀ庻 / 300ÂÊ / 163*240mm / Language: English / ISBN-10: 1848009372 ISBN-13: 978-1848009370
    ¡¤ ISBN:9781848009370
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The project of writing this monograph was conceived in August 2006. It is a m- ter of delight and satisfaction that this monograph would be published during the centenary year (May 27, 2008 - May 26, 2009) of our dear alma mater, the Indian Institute of Science, which is truly a magni cent temple and an eternal source of inspiration, with a splendid ambiance for research. Studying the rational behavior of entities interacting with each other in or- nized or ad-hoc marketplaces has been the bread and butter of our research group here at the Electronic Commerce Laboratory,Department of Computer Science and Automation, Indian Institute of Science. Speci cally, the application of game th- retic modeling and mechanism design principles to the area of network economics was an area of special interest to the authors. In fact, the dissertations of the s- ond, third, and fourth authors (Dinesh Garg, Ramasuri Narayanam, and Hastagiri Prakash) were all in this area. Dinesh Garg's Doctoral Thesis, which later won the Best Dissertation Award at the Department of Computer Science and Automation, Indian Institute of Science for the academic year 2006-07, included an interesting chapter on applying the brilliant work of Roger Myerson (Nobel laureate in E- nomic Sciences in 2007) to the topical problem of sponsored search auctions on the web. Ramasuri's Master's work applied mechanism design to develop robust broadcastprotocolsin wireless adhoc networkswhile Hastagiri's Master's work - veloped resource allocation mechanisms for computational grids.



Introduction Motivating Problems in Network Economics Mechanism Design Outline of the Monograph Foundations of Mechanism Design Strategic Form Games Dominant Strategy Equilibria Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium Bayesian Games The Mechanism Design Environment Examples of Social Choice Functions Implementation of Social Choice Functions Incentive Compatibility and the Revelation Theorem Properties of Social Choice Functions The Gibbard Satterthwaite Impossibility Theorem Arrow's Impossibility Theorem The Quasi Linear Environment Groves Mechanisms Clarke (Pivotal) Mechanisms Examples of VCG Mechanisms Bayesian Implementation: The dAGVA Mechanism Bayesian Incentive Compatibility in Linear Environment Revenue Equivalence Theorem Myerson Optimal Auction Further Topics in Mechanism Design To Probe Further Mechanism Design for Sponsored Search Auctions Internet Advertising Sponsored Search Auction Sponsored Search Auction as a Mechanism Design Problem Generalized First Price (GFP) Mechanism Generalized Second Price (GSP) Mechanism Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) Mechanism Optimal (OPT) Mechanism Comparison of GSP, VCG, and OPT Mechanisms Individual Rationality Computational Complexity Summary and Future Work Related Literature Mechanism Design for Resource Procurement in Grid Computing Grid Computing The Model The G-DSIC Mechanism The G-BIC Mechanism G-OPT: An Optimal Auction Mechanism Current Art and Future Perspective Incentive Compatible Broadcast Protocols for Ad hoc Networks with Selfish Nodes Introduction to Ad hoc Wireless Networks Ad hoc Networks with Selfish Nodes Relevant Work on Incentive Compatible Protocols A Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatible Broadcast Protocol A Bayesian Incentive Compatible Broadcast (BIC-B) Protocol DSIC-B Protocol versus BIC-B Protocol: A Discussion Conclusions and Future Work To Probe Further Topics in Mechanism Design Key Application Areas In Conclusion



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