The Concept of Law is the most important and original work of legal philosophy written this century. First published in 1961, it is considered the masterpiece of H.L.A. Hart's enormous contribution to the study of jurisprudence and legal philosophy. Its elegant language and balanced arguments have sparked wide debate and unprecedented growth in the quantity and quality of scholarship in this area--much of it devoted to attacking or defending Hart's theories. Principal among Hart's critics is renowned lawyer and political philosopher Ronald Dworkin who in the 1970s and 80s mounted a series of challenges to Hart's Concept of Law. It seemed that Hart let these challenges go unanswered until, after his death in 1992, his answer to Dworkin's criticism was discovered among his papers. In this valuable and long-awaited new edition Hart presents an Epilogue in which he answers Dworkin and some of his other most influential critics including Fuller and Finnis. Written with the same clarity and candor for which the first edition is famous, the Epilogue offers a sharper interpretation of Hart's own views, rebuffs the arguments of critics like Dworkin, and powerfully asserts that they have based their criticisms on a faulty understanding of Hart's work. Hart demonstrates that Dworkin's views are in fact strikingly similar to his own. In a final analysis, Hart's response leaves Dworkin's criticisms considerably weakened and his positions largely in question. Containing Hart's final and powerful response to Dworkin in addition to the revised text of the original Concept of Law, this thought-provoking and persuasively argued volume is essential reading for lawyers and philosophers throughout the world

I. PERSISTENT QUESTIONS 1 (17)
1. Perplexities of Legal Theory 1 (5)
2. Three Recurrent Issues 6 (7)
3. Definition 13 (5)
II. LAWS, COMMANDS, AND ORDERS 18 (8)
1. Varieties of Imperatives 18 (2)
2. Law as Coercive Orders 20 (6)
III. THE VARIETY OF LAWS 26 (24)
1. The Content of Laws 27 (15)
2. The Range of Application 42 (2)
3. Modes of Origin 44 (6)
IV. SOVEREIGN AND SUBJECT 50 (29)
1. The Habit of Obedience and the 51 (10)
Continuity of Law
2. The Persistence of Law 61 (5)
3. Legal Limitations on Legislative Power 66 (5)
4. The Sovereign behind the Legislature 71 (8)
V. LAW AS THE UNION OF PRIMARY AND SECONDARY 79 (21)
RULES
1. A Fresh Start 79 (3)
2. The Idea of Obligation 82 (9)
3. The Elements of Law 91 (9)
VI. THE FOUNDATIONS OF A LEGAL SYSTEM 100(24)
1. Rule of Recognition and Legal Validity 100(10)
2. New Questions 110(7)
3. The Pathology of a Legal System 117(7)
VII. FORMALISM AND RULE-SCEPTICISM 124(31)
1. The Open Texture of Law 124(12)
2. Varieties of Rule-Scepticism 136(5)
3. Finality and Infallibility in Judicial 141(6)
Decision
4. Uncertainty in the Rule of Recognition 147(8)
VIII. JUSTICE AND MORALITY 155(30)
1. Principles of Justice 157(10)
2. Moral and Legal Obligation 167(13)
3. Moral Ideals and Social Criticism 180(5)
IX. LAWS AND MORALS 185(28)
1. Natural Law and Legal Positivism 185(8)
2. The Minimum Content of Natural Law 193(7)
3. Legal Validity and Moral Value 200(13)
X. INTERNATIONAL LAW 213(25)
1. Sources of Doubt 213(3)
2. Obligations and Sanctions 216(4)
3. Obligation and the Sovereignty of States 220(7)
4. International Law and Morality 227(5)
5. Analogies of Form and Content 232(6)
Postscript 238(1)
Introductory 238(39)
1. The Nature of Legal Theory 239(5)
2. The Nature of Legal Positivism 244(10)
(i) Positivism as a Semantic Theory 244(4)
(ii) Positivism as an Interpretive Theory 248(2)
(iii) Soft Positivism 250(4)
3. The Nature of Rules 254(9)
(i) The Practice Theory of Rules 254(5)
(ii) Rules and Principles 259(4)
4. Principles and the Rule of Recognition 263(5)
Pedigree and Interpretation 263(5)
5. Law and Morality 268(4)
(i) Rights and Duties 268(1)
(ii) The Identification of the Law 269(3)
6. Judicial Discretion 272(5)
Notes 277(32)
Index 309