시리즈명 : Frontiers of Economic Research  | Textual Format : Readings/Anthologies/Collected Works   | Academic Level : Scholarly/Graduate

Classics in Game Theory assembles in one sourcebook the basic contributions to the field that foll
 owed on the publication of Theory of Games and Economic Behavior by John von Neumann and Oskar Mor
 genstern. Harold Kuhn, himself a major contributor to game theory for his reformulation of extensi
 ve games, has chosen eighteen essays that constitute the core of game theory as it exists today.
 Drawn from a variety of sources, they will be an invaluable tool for researchers in game theory an
 d for a broad group of students of economics, political science and biology.

Permissions 
Foreword 
An Appreciation 
Equilibrium Points in n-Person Games p. 3
The Bargaining Problem p. 5
Non-Cooperative Games p. 14
An Iterative Method of Solving a Game p. 27
Equivalence of Games in Extensive Form p. 36
Extensive Games and the Problem and Information p. 46
A Value for n-Person Games p. 69
Stochastic Games p. 80
Recursive Games p. 87
Von Neumann-Morgenstern Solutions to Cooperative Games without Side Payments p. 119
A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy p. 127
The Bargaining Set for Cooperative Games p. 140
Existence of Competitive Equilibria in Markets with a Continuum of Traders p. 170
The Core of an n-Person Game p. 192
Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players. Part I: The Basic Model p. 216
 p. 247
Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players. Part III: The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game p. 268
The Big Match p. 289
On Market Games p. 296
Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games p. 317
List of Contributors p. 355
Index p. 357
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