This book develops a framework for analyzing the creation and consolidation of democracy. Different social groups prefer different political institutions because of the way they allocate political power and resources. Thus democracy is preferred by the majority of citizens, but opposed by elites. Dictatorship nevertheless is not stable when citizens can threaten social disorder and revolution. In response, when the costs of repression are sufficiently high and promises of concessions are not credible, elites may be forced to create democracy. By democratizing, elites credibly transfer political power to the citizens, ensuring social stability. Democracy consolidates when elites do not have strong incentives to overthrow it. These processes depend on the strength of civil society, the structure of political institutions, the nature of political and economic crises, the level of economic inequality, the structure of the economy, and the form and extent of globalization.

Preface xi
 PART ONE. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
 Paths of Political Development 1(14)
 Britain 2(3)
 Argentina 5(3)
 Singapore 8(2)
 South Africa 10(4)
 The Agenda 14(1)
 Our Argument 15(33)
 Democracy versus Nondemocracy 16(3)
 Building Blocks of Our Approach 19(3)
 Toward Our Basic Story 22(1)
 Our Theory of Democratization 23(7)
 Democratic Consolidation 30(1)
 Determinants of Democracy 31(11)
 Political Identities and the Nature of Conflict 42(1)
 Democracy in a Picture 43(3)
 Overview of the Book 46(2)
 What Do We Know about Democracy? 48(41)
 Measuring Democracy 48(3)
 Patterns of Democracy 51(7)
 Democracy, Inequality, and Redistribution 58(7)
 Crises and Democracy 65(1)
 Social Unrest and Democratization 65(10)
 The Literature 75(5)
 Our Contribution 80(9)
 PART TWO. MODELING POLITICS
 Democratic Politics 89(29)
 Introduction 89(2)
 Aggregating Individual Preferences 91(1)
 Single-Peaked Preferences and the Median Voter Theorem 92(7)
 Our Workhorse Models 99(14)
 Democracy and Political Equality 113(4)
 Conclusion 117(1)
 Nondemocratic Politics 118(55)
 Introduction 118(2)
 Power and Constraints in Nondemocratic Politics 120(8)
 Modeling Preferences and Constraints in Nondemocracies 128(5)
 Commitment Problems 133(11)
 A Simple Game of Promises 144(7)
 A Dynamic Model 151(10)
 Incentive-Compatible Promises 161(10)
 Conclusion 171(2)
 PART THREE. THE CREATION AND CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRACY
 Democratization 173(48)
 Introduction 173(1)
 The Role of Political Institutions 173(3)
 Preferences over Political Institutions 176(1)
 Political Power and Institutions 177(4)
 A Static Model of Democratization 181(5)
 Democratization or Repression? 186(7)
 A Dynamic Model of Democratization 193(8)
 Subgame Perfect Equilibria 201(2)
 Alternative Political Identities 203(4)
 Targeted Transfers 207(1)
 Power of the Elites in Democracy 207(4)
 Ideological Preferences over Regimes 211(3)
 Democratization in a Picture 214(1)
 Equilibrium Revolutions 215(3)
 Conclusion 218(3)
 Coups and Consolidation 221(34)
 Introduction 221(3)
 Incentives for Coups 224(1)
 A Static Model of Coups 225(6)
 A Dynamic Model of the Creation and Consolidation of Democracy 231(15)
 Alternative Political Identities 246(1)
 Targeted Transfers 246(1)
 Power in Democracy and Coups 247(2)
 Consolidation in a Picture 249(2)
 Defensive Coups 251(2)
 Conclusion 253(2)
 PART FOUR. PUTTING THE MODELS TO WORK
 The Role of the Middle Class 255(32)
 Introduction 255(4)
 The Three-Class Model 259(3)
 Emergence of Partial Democracy 262(5)
 From Partial to Full Democracy 267(6)
 Repression: The Middle Class as a Buffer 273(5)
 Repression: Softliners versus Hardliners 278(5)
 The Role of the Middle Class in Consolidating Democracy 283(2)
 Conclusion 285(2)
 Economic Structure and Democracy 287(34)
 Introduction 287(3)
 Economic Structure and Income Distribution 290(2)
 Political Conflict 292(1)
 Capital, Land, and the Transition to Democracy 293(3)
 Costs of Coup on Capital and Land 296(4)
 Capital, Land, and the Burden of Democracy 300(7)
 Conflict between Landowners and Industrialists 307(5)
 Industrialists, Landowners, and Democracy in Practice 312(1)
 Economic Institutions 313(3)
 Human Capital 316(1)
 Conjectures about Political Development 317(2)
 Conclusion 319(2)
 Globalization and Democracy 321(28)
 Introduction 321(4)
 A Model of an Open Economy 325(6)
 Political Conflict -- Democratic Consolidation 331(3)
 Political Conflict -- Transition to Democracy 334(4)
 Financial Integration 338(5)
 Increased Political Integration 343(1)
 Alternative Assumptions about the Nature of International Trade 344(3)
 Conclusion 347(2)
 PART FIVE. CONCLUSIONS AND THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY
 Conclusions and the Future of Democracy 349(12)
 Paths of Political Development Revisited 349(6)
 Extensions and Areas for Future Research 355(3)
 The Future of Democracy 358(3)
 PART SIX. APPENDIX
 Appendix to Chapter 4: The Distribution of Power in Democracy 361(20)
 Introduction 361(1)
 Probabilistic Voting Models 361(6)
 Lobbying 367(6)
 Partisan Politics and Political Capture 373(8)
 Bibliography 381(20)
 Index 401